Denied: How a Plan to Feed a Million Palestinians with a Revolutionary System Was Sidelined for a Costly, Less Effective Alternative

The aspiration for food and water self-sufficiency remains a critical, yet elusive, goal for Palestinians. In recent years, the situation, particularly in the Gaza Strip, has escalated to alarming levels. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has repeatedly warned of imminent famine, a crisis exacerbated by ongoing hostilities, mass displacement, and severe restrictions on humanitarian access. As of May 2024, over half of Gaza’s agricultural land had been damaged, crippling local food production. This agricultural collapse is not an isolated incident but part of a broader pattern affecting Palestinian territories.

This dire state is not solely the result of natural conditions. While Palestine is arid, its water scarcity and food insecurity are profoundly shaped by what many observers call a “social and political construct.” Decades of occupation have imposed severe limitations on Palestinian access to their own natural resources, including land and water, fostering economic dependency.

It is crucial to understand that this dire state is not solely the result of natural conditions or climatic challenges. While Palestine is located in an arid to semi-arid region, its water scarcity and food insecurity are profoundly shaped by a “social and political construct”. Decades of occupation have imposed severe limitations on Palestinian access to their own natural resources. These include restrictions on movement, constrained access to agricultural land and water sources, and the systematic de-development of the Palestinian economy, which has rendered it dependent and vulnerable. The control exerted over water resources, for instance, has been a defining feature of the occupation, with policies and practices that ensure a deeply unequal distribution and utilization of shared water sources.

But what if a different path had been taken?

Picture 1993. As Yitzhak Rabin and Yassir Arafat made history with a peace agreement, another, quieter plan for Palestine was taking shape. At its center was Dr. Mark McMurtry, inventor of the groundbreaking Integrated Aqua-Vegeculture System (iAVs)—a method designed to grow vast amounts of food with minimal water, even in arid lands.

The Integrated Aqua-Vegeculture System (iAVs) was pioneered in the 1980s by Dr. Mark McMurtry and a multidisciplinary team at North Carolina State University (NCSU), including notable figures like Dr. Doug Sanders, Dr. Merle Jensen and Dr. Paul V. Nelson. The efficacy of iAVs was not merely theoretical but was substantiated through a decade of rigorous research and multiple peer-reviewed publications stemming from the work at NCSU between 1987 and 1997.

Dr. McMurtry’s consistent advocacy for iAVs as an open-source technology, freely available for global use, was central to his vision of empowering communities to achieve sustainable food production. The extensive research at NCSU, involving faculty from numerous departments and collaboration with external institutions and government agencies, should have positioned iAVs as a prime candidate for adoption by international development organizations. The system’s inherent design for simplicity, resource conservation, and resilience aligned directly with the mandates of organizations like the FAO, tasked with combating hunger and promoting sustainable agriculture.

Recognizing the global potential of iAVs, Dr. McMurtry and the NCSU iAVs Research Group proactively sought to engage the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This outreach was not unsolicited; it was encouraged by both the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the USDA’s Office of International Cooperation and Development (OICD), signaling that these influential U.S. government bodies recognized the system’s merit and international applicability.

On July 17, 1989, the NCSU group contacted Dr. Khadi of the FAO Irrigation Program in Rome, providing detailed information about the iAVs methodology, research findings, and its potential for food-insecure regions. Following this initial contact, Dr. Douglas C. Sanders, then Chair of the iAVs Research Group at NCSU, personally visited the FAO headquarters in Rome on September 2-3, 1990. Dr. Sanders reported that he felt his presentation on iAVs was well received by FAO officials.

Despite these direct engagement efforts, which were supported by recommendations from major U.S. development agencies, the outcome was profoundly disappointing. According to Dr. McMurtry’s account, “despite these efforts, no response was ever received” from FAO officials following the initial contact. Similarly, after Dr. Sanders’ visit and presentation in Rome, “a significant amount of time passed without any communication from FAO officials. Despite multiple follow-up attempts – including reaching out repeatedly – no response was ever received from anyone connected with the FAO”.

This silence from a leading global food and agriculture agency, in the face of a well-researched, promising technology backed by other significant development players, represents a critical early juncture in the iAVs narrative. It raises questions about the FAO’s internal processes, its receptiveness to innovative solutions from external academic groups, and potentially, other unstated factors influencing its engagement priorities.

The year 1993 marked a pivotal moment, not only in Middle Eastern politics with the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) but also for the potential application of iAVs technology on an unprecedented scale.

On September 13, 1993, the very day Yitzhak Rabin and Yassir Arafat concluded their historic peace agreement, the White House initiated contact with North Carolina State University’s Office of International Programs to locate Dr. Mark McMurtry. He was eventually found on vacation and urgently brought to a high-level conference in Little Rock, Arkansas.

The list of attendees at this conference underscored the significance of the gathering and the serious consideration being given to innovative solutions for Palestinian development. It included the PLO Delegation to the United Nations, senior representatives from the U.S. Department of State and USAID, staff from Vice President Al Gore’s office, officials from the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – IBRD), and various non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This assembly represented a powerful convergence of political will and development finance.

At this conference, Dr. McMurtry presented the iAVs technology. The proposal was ambitious and transformative: to scale up the iAVs methodology to feed one million people. This was to be achieved on just 128 hectares (approximately 316 acres) of land in Jericho, a city in the West Bank designated for early Palestinian self-rule under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. A critical component of the plan was the utilization of fossil groundwater located approximately 1,000 meters beneath the Dead Sea, a resource that could potentially unlock large-scale agriculture in an arid region.

The reception to Dr. McMurtry’s presentation and the Jericho proposal was overwhelmingly enthusiastic, particularly from the Palestinian delegation, who saw in it a viable path towards greater food security and self-reliance. Leadership at NCSU was reportedly optimistic about the project’s prospects. This optimism was bolstered by substantial financial commitments and high-level political endorsements. The World Bank pledged “several billion U.S. dollars” in development funds for the initiative.

Furthermore, the project secured declared backing from influential figures in the Clinton Administration, including Vice President Al Gore and Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, alongside funding assurances from both the IBRD and USAID. The World Bank’s involvement in the West Bank and Gaza was indeed intensifying during this period, with the establishment of trust funds and emergency assistance programs aimed at underpinning the peace process through economic development.

When details of the ambitious plan became known to Israel, significant political opposition arose. The objections from the Israeli side were fundamental and targeted the core elements of Palestinian self-sufficiency that the project aimed to foster. According to Dr. McMurtry’s account, Israel was unwilling to permit Palestinian access to the deep fossil groundwater reserves beneath the recently ceded Palestinian territories, nor would it allow access to fresh water resources in the West Bank for such a large-scale Palestinian-led project.

The broader sentiment was a clear lack of interest in, or even opposition to, Palestinian food self-sufficiency. This stance on water resources is particularly telling, as control over water was a fiercely negotiated and ultimately, critics argue, asymmetrically resolved issue within the Oslo framework, often leaving Palestinians with limited sovereignty over their water. Israel’s refusal to allow access to the fossil water, a non-renewable but potentially game-changing resource for Jericho’s arid environment, underscored a determination to maintain strategic control over all water resources in the region, potentially ensuring long-term Palestinian water dependency.

A powerful backlash emanated from the U.S.-Israeli lobby and allied Congressional representatives. Among the most vocal and influential opponents was Jesse Helms, North Carolina’s Senior U.S. Senator and, critically, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Senator Helms, a prominent figure in the conservative movement and a staunch supporter of Israel viewed the Jericho iAVs project as an ‘anti-Israeli policy.’ He expressed his profound anger and opposition directly to NCSU officials and to Dr. McMurtry himself.

A central and frequently invoked tenet of Senator Helms’ pro-Israel advocacy was his characterization of Israel as “America’s aircraft carrier in the Middle East”. This powerful metaphor served as the linchpin for his argument that Israel provided an indispensable military and strategic foothold for the United States in a volatile but critically important region. He contended that this strategic value alone justified the substantial military and economic assistance the U.S. provided to Israel. Helms argued that U.S. aid to Israel should logically be funded from the Department of Defense budget, framing it as an investment in U.S. security rather than traditional foreign aid. He often posed the rhetorical question: “If Israel did not exist, what would U.S. defense costs in the Middle East be?” , implying that supporting Israel was a cost-effective way to project American power and protect its interests.

Often referred to as “Senator No,” Helms was renowned for his staunch opposition to measures and ideologies he deemed contrary to his conservative worldview. Domestically, this manifested in vehement opposition to civil rights advancements and gay rights. His transformation from the Democratic to the Republican party in 1970, largely driven by his opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, further illustrates the profound ideological commitments that would later define his foreign policy stances.

Jesse Helms, who served as a United States Senator for North Carolina from 1973 to 2003, was an undeniable and formidable figure in the American conservative movement. Helms harbored a profound skepticism towards foreign aid, which he often derided with phrases like “pouring money down foreign rat holes” or as “handouts” that fostered dependency rather than sustainable development. His voting record reflected this conviction; he famously noted that he had “never voted for a foreign aid giveaway”.

Given Senator Helms’s powerful committee chairmanship and his known assertiveness in foreign policy matters, his opposition carried immense weight and could effectively stall or kill initiatives, even those with administration backing. The framing of a Palestinian food self-sufficiency project as ‘anti-Israeli’ was a potent political maneuver, shifting the discourse from development and humanitarian aid to one of geopolitical alignment, thereby making it exceedingly difficult for U.S. entities to support it in a political climate highly attuned to Israeli security narratives. His opposition was fundamentally about not providing resources to entities he distrusted or viewed as inimical to U.S. and Israeli interests.

Helms exhibited a strong anti-internationalist streak, particularly concerning multilateral institutions. He harbored a deep distrust of international organizations, most notably the United Nations, which he frequently criticized as corrupt, inefficient, anti-American, and feckless. His critique extended to U.S. foreign aid agencies, particularly the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which he also characterized as suffering from “fecklessness”.

The political firestorm unleashed was described by sources involved as “the gates of hell opening”. Despite efforts by the Clinton Administration to mediate and appease the project’s opponents, the collective weight of Israeli objections and the powerful domestic U.S. lobbying against it proved insurmountable. The Jericho iAVs project, once brimming with promise and backed by billions in potential funding, collapsed under this intense political pressure

The severity of the opposition was further underscored by a direct warning conveyed to Dr. McMurtry from Senator Helms. He was cautioned that persisting with the project could lead to severe repercussions, with heads “rolling from the bottom (McMurtry) all the way to the top,” indicating that even high-ranking supporters of the initiative could face negative consequences.

The failure of the Jericho iAVs initiative was a devastating blow to Palestinian aspirations for food self-sufficiency. A technologically advanced, large-scale solution, which had garnered significant international backing and promised a pathway out of food dependency for a substantial portion of the population, was effectively vetoed due to geopolitical considerations.

For Dr. McMurtry, the intense political battle and the project’s demise marked a turning point, foreshadowing the professional challenges he would later face. The episode starkly illustrated that in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even scientifically sound and well-funded development projects aimed at Palestinian advancement could be derailed if they were perceived to challenge Israeli strategic interests or the political positions of its powerful allies in the United States. The Jericho iAVs story demonstrates that Palestinian food and water security is not merely a technical or economic challenge but is deeply enmeshed in, and often a casualty of, the broader political conflict and the asymmetrical power dynamics that define it.

Years later, in 2012, the very same FAO that had ignored the open-source, highly efficient iAVs, launched its own aquaponics initiative in Gaza. Instead of a system to feed a million, the FAO’s plan began with just 15 rooftop pilot units, later expanding to target only around 80 additional households. These units, part of what became known as the “Gaza model,” cost over $1,000 each (initially reported between $1,500 – $2,000 for the pilot units including plants for one season). At maximum capacity, each household unit was estimated to produce only 20-25 lettuce heads per week and 35-40 kg of fish annually – a stark contrast to iAVs’ potential.

This FAO-backed system used a ‘traditional’ aquaponics design, a flood-and-drain gravel-media model. Critically, this model is a derivative of iAVs, but one where iAVs’ foundational open-source principles were, modified into a commercially promoted system (for profit) that was far less effective and more costly.” This choice by FAO seems to have been deliberate, effectively hindering Gaza’s potential for greater food self-sufficiency.

The FAO’s choice of these ‘traditional’ systems, which proved to have inherent sustainability issues in the challenging Gazan context, especially when a more resilient and more productive alternative like iAVs had been previously presented to them and was designed to overcome such limitations, raises serious questions. If the political climate remained hostile to any large-scale Palestinian food autonomy, as evidenced by the Jericho project’s failure, it is conceivable that the FAO might have been guided, whether subtly or overtly, towards implementing smaller, less transformative, and ultimately less sustainable projects that did not fundamentally alter the dependency paradigm.

The “Gaza model” claimed to use less than 50% of the water of conventional farming. However, iAVs is documented to use 90% less water, or even more. Furthermore, beneficiaries of the Gaza project, often vulnerable individuals with no prior farming experience, struggled with ongoing input costs and the technical demands once initial support and subsidies ended. Introducing this soilless, water-and-gravel cultivation method was a ‘paradigm shift‘ that required significant effort to overcome local skepticism.

The FAO’s actions, and its subsequent publications like the “Aquaponics Food Production Systems” paper (ISBN 9789251085325), are also heavily criticized. The paper completely omitted any mention of iAVs or Dr. McMurtry’s foundational work, despite iAVs being the most extensively researched, documented, and published methodology in the field. The FAO was attempting to resolve issues that have already been effectively addressed by iAVs, leading to questions of deliberate bias. This oversight deprived beneficiaries in Gaza of far more effective solutions and showed a lack of professional integrity and competence and a calloused disregard for fact, history, evidence.

Such an omission would mean that practitioners, researchers, and policymakers relying on FAO guidance would remain unaware of a potentially superior or more suitable methodology, particularly for challenging environments. This could perpetuate the adoption of less optimal systems, thereby hindering efforts to achieve sustainable food production in regions that could most benefit from the unique advantages of iAVs. The failure to include or even acknowledge such a significant body of research in a supposedly comprehensive technical guide lends credence to the concerns about a systemic effort to sideline or erase this particular technological lineage from the FAO’s institutional narrative and recommendations.

What became of Dr. McMurtry? Upon returning to the US in 1996 after his work in Africa, he discovered his university tenure had been terminated. The stated reason: his staunch opposition to NCSU’s plans to license iAVs technology – which he had deliberately made open-source – to large food production conglomerates. His fight to keep iAVs accessible for all, especially for regions like Palestine, ultimately cost him his academic position, though the intense political heat from the Jericho project may well have contributed to the university’s decision.

The question remains: A proven, open-source system with the potential to feed a million Palestinians was offered, backed by immense funding and high-level support. It was blocked. Years later, a far smaller, more expensive, and less efficient derivative was implemented by a major UN agency that had previously ignored the original, superior technology. Why?

The people of Palestine, and all those striving for food sovereignty in challenging environments, deserve access to the best, most effective, and truly sustainable solutions. The story of iAVs is a stark reminder of how politics and institutional inertia can obstruct progress, and why the fight for open-source, impactful innovations must continue.

The obstruction of the Jericho iAVs project, particularly the denial of access to essential water resources and the explicit opposition to Palestinian food self-sufficiency, cannot be viewed in isolation. It aligns with a broader, extensively documented pattern of Israeli policies that systematically curtail Palestinian access to their own natural resources, especially water and agricultural land. These policies have created an environment where Palestinian agricultural development and aspirations for self-reliance are perpetually undermined.

The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, were intended to pave the way for Palestinian self-governance. However, crucial aspects like water rights were addressed in ways that critics argue have entrenched, rather than alleviated, Israeli control over Palestinian water resources. The establishment of the Joint Water Committee (JWC), for example, a body requiring joint Israeli-Palestinian approval for water projects in the West Bank, has effectively granted Israel veto power over Palestinian water infrastructure development. As a result, Palestinians face severe restrictions on drilling new wells or rehabilitating existing ones, while Israeli settlements in the occupied territories often have far more liberal access to water resources extracted from shared aquifers. This has led to a situation where the Palestinian Water Authority is largely dependent on purchasing water from Israel’s national water company, Mekorot.

Beyond water, Palestinian agriculture faces numerous other constraints imposed by the occupation. Vast tracts of fertile agricultural land in the West Bank have been confiscated for the construction and expansion of Israeli settlements and their associated infrastructure, including bypass roads and security zones.

Farmers often face restricted access to their lands, particularly those located near settlements or the Separation Barrier. The Barrier itself has resulted in the de facto annexation of significant portions of the West Bank’s most fertile land and has disrupted access to water sources and markets. In the Gaza Strip, the situation is even more acute, with the Israeli blockade severely limiting the import of essential agricultural inputs, including fertilizers and equipment, often under the pretext of “dual-use” security concerns. There have also been reports of “herbicidal warfare,” where herbicides are sprayed along the border, damaging Palestinian crops. The cumulative effect of these policies is what Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network, terms “de-development”—a systematic process of undermining the productive capacity of the Palestinian economy and fostering dependency.

The failure of the Amoro mushroom farm in the West Bank, a project aimed at breaking an Israeli monopoly, serves as a stark example: after initial success, Israeli forces reportedly threatened grocers stocking the Palestinian product and delayed critical imported supplies until they expired, effectively shuttering the enterprise. These systemic mechanisms of control create an environment where even well-intentioned and technologically sound agricultural projects struggle to achieve scale or sustainability, reinforcing a cycle of dependency.

The international community, including donor nations and development agencies, operates within this highly restrictive and politically charged environment. Billions of dollars in aid have been channeled to the Palestinian territories since the Oslo Accords, ostensibly to support institution-building, economic development, and humanitarian relief. However, there is a growing body of critique arguing that this aid, while providing essential support in some areas, has largely failed to achieve its long-term development goals and may, in some instances, inadvertently reinforce the status quo of occupation and dependency.

The failure of the large-scale, high-potential Jericho iAVs project, which was explicitly blocked due to its implications for Palestinian autonomy, juxtaposed with the later implementation of smaller, FAO-led “traditional” aquaponics projects in Gaza, could be interpreted as a form of “managed” development. This approach might allow for some minimal progress to address acute humanitarian concerns while ensuring that no breakthroughs occur that could lead to genuine economic independence or challenge the existing power structures.

Food sovereignty, as defined by movements like La Via Campesina, emphasizes “the right of Peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems”. It is a call for reclaiming control over land, water, seeds, and local food economies, thereby reducing dependency on external inputs and politically volatile supply chains.

Initiatives like the Integrated Aqua-Vegeculture System (iAVs), with its emphasis on resource efficiency, local production, and reduced reliance on external chemical inputs, align closely with the principles of food sovereignty. By enabling communities to produce a significant amount of their own food using local resources and sustainable methods, such technologies can be powerful tools for enhancing resilience and autonomy. However, it is precisely this potential for empowerment and reduced dependency that might be perceived as a threat by an occupying power invested in maintaining control and limiting the sovereign capabilities of the occupied population. The pursuit of food sovereignty, therefore, becomes an act of resistance against de-development and a strategy for building a more resilient and self-determined future.

The narrative of “water scarcity” in Palestine, often presented by Israeli authorities and sometimes echoed by international actors as a primarily natural or climatic issue, serves to obscure the political dimension of unequal resource allocation and Israeli appropriation of shared water resources. Such a depoliticized narrative benefits those who wish to avoid confronting the fundamental injustices that underpin Palestinian water insecurity and, by extension, food insecurity.

The sequence of events suggests that Dr. McMurtry found himself at the nexus of powerful, competing interests. On one hand, there was the intense geopolitical pressure surrounding any initiative that could significantly enhance Palestinian autonomy. Senator Jesse Helms, a formidable political force, had expressed his anger directly to NCSU over the Jericho project. As a state university, NCSU would undoubtedly be sensitive to disapproval from a senior U.S. Senator representing North Carolina, particularly one chairing the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The warning Dr. McMurtry received about heads “rolling” if he persisted with the Jericho project underscores the perilous nature of challenging such deeply entrenched political positions.

On the other hand, his principled resistance to the commercialization of iAVs, driven by a desire to ensure its accessibility for humanitarian purposes, placed him in direct opposition to the university’s potential financial interests. The combination of these factors—high-stakes political opposition stemming from the Palestine initiative and an internal institutional conflict over intellectual property and commercialization—likely created an untenable situation for Dr. McMurtry at NCSU.

The termination of his tenure, if indeed linked to these events, illustrates the significant personal and professional risks faced by academics and scientists whose work intersects with sensitive political issues or challenges powerful commercial agendas. It also raises concerns about the potential chilling effect such actions can have on innovation and the dissemination of technologies that could provide substantial public benefit, particularly if their champions are sidelined or silenced.

The evidence strongly suggests a pattern where Palestinian aspirations for food and water self-sufficiency have encountered significant, and at times seemingly deliberate, obstruction. iAVs, a scientifically validated technology developed at North Carolina State University with documented high efficiency and suitability for arid regions, offered a tangible pathway towards greater food independence for Palestinians.

The FAO’s role in this saga is particularly troubling. The organization’s initial non-response to credible outreach regarding iAVs in 1989-1990, despite encouragement from U.S. agencies, was a significant missed opportunity. More than two decades later, the FAO implemented smaller-scale, “traditional” aquaponic systems in Gaza which, according to Dr. McMurtry, were technologically inferior to iAVs and failed to deliver the potential benefits his system could have offered. These FAO projects in Gaza faced documented challenges with sustainability, input dependency, and beneficiary expertise—issues that iAVs was arguably better designed to mitigate. Compounding this, the FAO’s seminal 2014 technical paper on small-scale aquaponics conspicuously omitted any mention of iAVs or Dr. McMurtry’s extensive foundational research, effectively sidelining what he claims is the most researched methodology in the field. This pattern of behavior lends credence to Dr. McMurtry’s allegations of a “lack of professional integrity” and “deliberate bias” within the FAO.

The personal cost to Dr. McMurtry highlights the risks faced by individuals who challenge powerful interests in pursuit of humanitarian goals.

The most profound cost has been borne by the Palestinian people, who were denied a significant opportunity to enhance their food security and reduce dependency. The failure of the Jericho project and the subsequent implementation of less impactful solutions represent decades of lost potential. This narrative also erodes trust in international institutions like the FAO, whose mandate is to combat hunger and promote sustainable agriculture globally. If such organizations are perceived as being swayed by political pressures to the detriment of sound science and the needs of vulnerable populations, their credibility and effectiveness are severely undermined.

Call for Accountability and Rectification

Genuine accountability is essential. The political actors and institutions that actively worked to derail the Jericho iAVs project, thereby obstructing a major Palestinian development initiative, must be scrutinized for their impact on Palestinian human rights and self-determination.

The Food and Agriculture Organization, in particular, faces serious questions regarding its professional conduct. A transparent internal review of its historical engagement (or lack thereof) with Dr. McMurtry and the iAVs technology is warranted. This review should examine:

1. The reasons for the non-response to the initial iAVs outreach in 1989-1990.
2. The decision-making process behind the choice of aquaponic methodologies for the Gaza projects, and why iAVs was not considered or piloted despite its apparent advantages and prior presentation to FAO.
3. The editorial decisions leading to the complete omission of iAVs and Dr. McMurtry’s foundational work from its 2014 technical paper on aquaponics.

Rectification should include a formal acknowledgment of Dr. Mark McMurtry’s pioneering contributions to aquaponic science and the Integrated Aqua-Vegeculture System. Furthermore, the FAO and other relevant development organizations should undertake an objective re-evaluation of iAVs technology and its potential applicability for current and future food security initiatives, not only in Palestine but in other arid and resource-constrained regions globally.

The saga of iAVs in Palestine serves as a stark reminder that technological solutions, no matter how brilliant, cannot succeed in a vacuum. Without addressing the fundamental power imbalances and dismantling the political and physical architecture of obstruction, the pursuit of food justice and self-sufficiency for Palestinians will remain an arduous and unfinished struggle.

True progress requires not only innovative technologies but also the political courage to ensure they can be implemented for the benefit of those who need them most.